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NECESSITY OF OBJECTION IN THE INFERIOR COURT AS A PREREPRoHmiTioN.-There is much concommon-law jurisdictions
the
cases
of
the
different
fusion among
as to the circumstances under which a writ of prohibition is appropriate. In many states it has been held that the superior court has
a broad discretion, where the inferior court is exceeding its jurisdiction, either to issue the writ or to remand the petitioner to the
inferior court to seek there some more or less adequate remedy." Entirely distinct from this discretion, it is also said that the superior
court has a further discretion as to whether it will issue the writ
unless the petitioner has first raised objection in the lower court. 2
A perusal of the cases will show that these two different phases of
discretion have been confused, and this confusion has doubtless augmented the notable lack of consistency between the decisions of the
different states.
In one of the earliest West Virginia cases 3 dealing with the writ
of prohibition, the Supreme Court of Appeals announced that it
would grant the writ without objection having been urged in the
lower court. Nevertheless, the court cautiously adds, that under
proper circumstances, it would have a discretion to impose this prerequisite:
QUISITE TO SEEKING A WRIT OF

"In some instances this Court might decline to act in application for a writ of prohibition till such a motion was made
in the inferior court; for this writ is not granted ex debito
justitiae, but is rather to be granted or withheld according
to the circumstances of each particular case, and in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion."
The opinion in this case is based upon common-law principles. A
distinction is made between those instances in which lack of jurisdiction in the lower court is apparent on the face of the record and
those instances wherein lack of jurisdiction not appearing on the
face of the record, must be brought-to the court's attention by means
of a plea. In the latter class of cases the court says, objection must
have been made in the first instance in the lower court; in other instances a writ of prohibition will issue without such a prerequisite.
In 1882, not long after this decision was handed down, the following provision was added to section 1 of chapter 110 of the Code:
1

2

32 cYC. 613, et seq.; 22 R. C. L. § 8.
32 CYc. 624; 22 R. C. L. § 27.
Swinburn v. Smith, 15 W. Va. 483, 499 (1879).
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"The writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right, in all
cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court
has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers."
The evident intent of this addition to the statute is to limit, if
not to abolish, the superior court's discretion with reference to
granting or refusing the writ upon a presentation of facts showing
that the lower court is exceeding its jurisdiction. A vital question
for purposes of this discussion is the question whether the statute
operates upon that second phase of discretion, as to the necessity of
objection in the lower court as a prerequisite, hereinbefore mentioned. That it did abolish the discretion in the superior court as to
compelling the petitioner to seek alternative remedies in the lower
court seems to have been uniformly conceded in cases decided subsequently to enactment of the statute.
In view of the broad and emphatic language of the statute, it
would seem rather remarkable that in any case coming up for decision after enactment of the statute the question of the superior
-court's power to demand the prerequisite under discussion could
have been disposed of without referring to the possible, if not probable, effect of the statute. Yet in approximately a half-dozen cases
handed down after enactment of the statute the question is decided
without any reference to the statute. In Board of Education v.
Holt,4 it is said that the Supreme Court, "as an ordinary rule of
practice, subject to just exception," will not award the writ until
objection has been made in the lower court. The basis of the prerequisite is described by the court as "a matter of practice out of respect for the judge of the inferior tribunal." The prerequisite is
5
again prescribed in Knight v. Zalhiser,
where Judge Brannon,
speaking for the court, says :"I grant that this is not jurisdictional;
but it is, and ought to be, imperative practice." In Jennings v.
Judge, ' the writ was again refused because the petitioner had not
raised objection to the jurisdiction in the first instance in the lower
court. In an intervening case,' objection in the lower court was not
required because it appeared to the Supreme Court that the lower
court had acted with its eyes open. In the latter case, it is said that
4

51 W. Va. 435, 41 S. E. 337 (1902).
53 W. Va. 370. 44 S. E.- 778 (1903).
6 56 W. Va. 146, 49 S. E. 23 (1904).
r Board of Education v. Holt, 54 W. Va. 167, 46 S. E. 134 (1903).
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objection in the lower court "is only required as a matter of respect and courtesy to the circuit judge." Plainly, the Supreme
Court decided that the lower court deserved no courtesy nor respect
where it ought to know that it was exceeding its jurisdiction.
The question is discussed in these four cases in the light of common-law principles and no reference is made to the statute. While
a discretion is still recognized in the superior court, it will be noted
that the clear tendency is to exercise that discretion by way of insisting upon the prerequisite. In other words, to require it is the
rule; to dispense with it, the exception.
After Jennings v. Judge, came a reaction against the previous
comparatively strict requirement of the prerequisite. This reaction
becomes stronger in each successive decision. First, the superior
court's discretionary power to dispense with the prerequisite is emphasizedA Then the court, going back to its old original commonlaw doctrine, called attention to the fact that objection in the lower
court will not be required when it appears on the face of the record
that the lower court is exceeding its jurisdiction.9 In City of Charleston v. Littlepage,0 the court describes the rule requiring objection in the lower court as
"A discretionary one of courtesy and deference to the court
below, and does not apply if it appears in any manner that
such court has acted deliberately or has considered the question of its jurisdiction and intends to proceed."
The plain tendency of these later decisions is to create a new rule
out of the previous exception, and to relegate the old rule to the
status of an exception to the new rule. Finally, in 1915, in WelZ v.
Black," the court calls attention to the statute enacted in 1882 as
granting the writ of prohibition as a matter of right and as leaving
no discretion in the superior court to refuge the writ because objection has not been first raised in the lower court. The court says:
"Indeed, in view of the statute, granting the writ, 'as matter of right,' we do not see how such a rule [requiring objection in the lower court as a prerequisite] can be justified in
any case where it is proper to be issued at all."
3lfce v. Boothsville
RPL. 986 (1907).

Telephone Co., 62 W. Va. 521, 59 S. E. 501, 125 Am. ST.

0 St. Marys v. Woods, 67 W. Va. 110, 67 G. E. 176 (1910). See note 3, ante.
lo 73 W. Va. 156, 80 S. E. 131 (1911).
n 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666 (1915).
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In the later case of Marshz v. O'Brien,12 the rule is thus broadly
stated:
"When a court is attempting to proceed in a cause without
jurisdiction, prohibition lies, and the petitioner may apply to
this court in the first instance, as matter of right for the writ."
This seems to be the current rule, and it will be noted that it is
stated without exceptions. These later decisions seem, in effect, to
overrule the earlier decisions which say that the superior court has a
discretion to require objection in the lower court as a prerequisite
to seeking the writ. It is believed that the new rule is the better one.
It is in accord with the general purport, if not with the plain intent
of the statute. It conduces to certainty in the procedure. There may
arise instances where it would be difficult to estimate whether the
superior court would be inclined to show any "courtesy and respect" to the inferior court, and yet a litigant's interests would suffer by delay. The remedy is extraordinary, arbitrary and generally
resorted to in the face of an emergency. Moreover, it should not be
forgotten that, in granting the writ, the superior court is exercising
its original, not its appellate, jurisdiction. The proceedings upon
application for the writ are in no sense a continuation of the proceeding to be inhibited. A motion for a new trial and motions th correct by virtue of chapter 134 of the Code as prerequisites to appellate relief, bear no analogy to objection in the lower court as a prerequisite to issuing a writ of prohibition, simply because the latter
does not grant appellate, but original, relief.
-L. C.
82 W. Va. 508, 96 S. E. 785 (1918). The latest announcement of the rule is
State ex. rel. Constanzo v. Kindelberger, 106 S. E. 434 (W. Va. 1921).
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